DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 190 200 PS 011 051

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TITLE A Functional Approach to Language Development.
PUB DATE Nov 79
NOTE 23p.; Paper presented at the Conference on Children of the 80's (Urbana, IL, November 5-7, 1979).
AVAILABLE FROM To be published as a chapter in "Current Topics in Early Childhood Education". Vol. 3, 1980. Lilian Katz (ERIC Clearinghouse on Early Childhood Education), Editor. Ablex Publishing Corp., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, NJ 07648 ($17.50).

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Communication Skills; Disadvantaged Youth; Early Childhood Education; *Language Acquisition; *Language Usage; Perspective Taking; *Preschool Children; Speech Communication

ABSTRACT

Since language largely derives from social interaction, preschool children should be provided many opportunities to converse, question and play with words. In this way children learn what to do with language in order to communicate effectively and appropriately. Recently begun investigations of language as it is actually used may produce findings that will be important to teachers of preschool children. One recent study has compared socially disadvantaged children's ability to tell their teacher a story from a picture seen either (1) with both the teacher and the child looking at the picture, or (2) with the teacher blindfolded and the child looking at the picture. It was found that when the theacher could not see (because of her "sore eyes") the children made attempts to speak more explicitly. When both the teacher and the children could see the picture, the children apparently assumed that the teacher did not need a definite account. These findings indicate the reserves of verbal skill possessed by socially disadvantaged children. They also suggest the need of a context meaningful to the child and one that provides opportunities to use verbal skills, if children's competencies are to be displayed. Teachers should develop skills in recognizing and utilizing such contexts as they occur naturally when adults and children interact in the preschool. (Author/RH)

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A Functional Approach to Language Development

Anne T. McKenna

One of the dominant figures in the field of linguistics in the past decade, Noam Chomsky, gave the first adequate explanation for the generative aspects of child language. In so doing he appeared to postulate a return to a simple nativist model of language development in which language is held to be innate, possessed by human beings solely because we are human. When phenomena are established as innate or species specific it is futile to search for influences which will promote or refine their use and theories of language acquisition grounded on the notion of innateness offer little hope for environmental intervention.

It is now becoming clear that Chomsky's model of language acquisition may be both limited and limiting when applied to the field of early education, as an essential tenet of a teacher's belief is a faith in the importance of the environment for early development. Although Chomsky's model does account for the fact that almost all children appear to extract syntactical rules on the basis of scanty and limited exposure to a non-didactic form of language, it leaves us with the disconcerting reality that there are great differences in language ability from child to child. And so attention has now moved from the acquisition process itself, which almost all children accomplish effectively, to the use of these acquired language structures, which all children do not accomplish effectively and to which we attribute the language deficiency of many of our preschool children.

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Rules of use

This change of attention in psycholinguistics which holds such promise for those engaged in early education, is a change of emphasis from what has been called the rules of usage to the rules of use, or a change of emphasis from the rules of syntactical competence to the rules of knowing what to do with language in order to communicate effectively and appropriately (Widdowson 1979). We might be inclined to think from our experience with other kinds of skills, such as playing bridge or chess, that the child learns the rules and, having learned them, goes on to learn how to apply them. But in what sense is the person who has just learned the rules of the game a good player? The real skill lies not in having knowledge of the rules, but in developing an ability to deploy these in a variety of situations, to create strategies while at the same time reacting and accommodating to the strategies of a partner. Just as familiarity with the use of rules, in addition to mere knowledge of the rules, separates the good from the bad player, so it is with language: The child who is "good at language" is the child who can identify the right occasion on which to use it, who can make language work for him or her appropriately and effectively--in a school situation and out of it (Widdowson, 1979). It is to this question of language use that we now turn our attention rather than to the acquisition of rule governed sentences or correct speech in young children.

The chronological sequence of learning of rules followed by the application of these rules is one which might be challenged in explanation of language acquisition. In a sense we do not learn the rules first and then put them to use, but just the converse. It is more like being thrown unprepared into a game, and by dint of playing well or badly,

slowly picking up the rules. The infant in the first years of life, having acquired great skill in interacting with others in the family (that is, knowing the non-verbal rules for interacting), picks up very easily the verbal ones that accompany them. As one linguist puts it, children learn to mean before they learn to speak and only learn to speak because they have first learned to mean (Halliday, 1975).

For instance, if we observe one-year-old children, it is clear that they are aware that the world is made up of people and non-people; that people have plans and intentions but objects in the environment do not; that you can regulate other people by crying or cajoling, but that this is wasted on the cat or the table. These fine existential distinctions pre-date the use of language and indeed are probably the major causative factors in its onset. Building on the ability to recognize "the other" and seeing this other as something that can be communicated with, the child first uses language for the social purpose of interacting with and regulating other people as well as for the purpose of getting them to do what the child wants (Halliday, 1975). In a previous paper I used the analogy of language being the old shoe which the child slips into with ease and familiarity (McKenna, 1977). It fits the child's needs so comfortably for the simple reason that it was made to fit these same needs when it was first created. Its structure is matched, is isomorphic with, the structure of the non-verbal interaction the child is already engaged upon. For example, recognition of the separateness from others is mirrored in language by the device of switching from "me" to "you" depending on the speaker. Further recognition of another's perspective is signaled linguistically by what are called deictic terms of "this" which becomes "that" or "here" which becomes "there,"

depending on who is speaking and who is listening. Yet another comfortable fit can be seen between the child's competence in asking, ordering or pleading, and the linguistic device of changed intonation or change of grammatical mood. Language to the child has an almost deja vu feeling when first encountered, because it was created by our first speaking ancestors from the same mental categories, to suit the same social needs as those possessed by every child and every adult.

Language as decontextualization

Language therefore largely derives from social interaction and in its beginning is inextricably bound up with the here and now of such interaction. Nevertheless, its development as a tool of adult thinking and communication depends on its becoming free of any context, of any here and now elements. The decontextualization of language means a lessening of dependency on other, non-verbal aspects of the situation in which communication is happening, like time, place, present perceptual evidence and--most importantly--the rush of things inside one's own head. For one of the most constraining here and now elements that the child has to contend with is his or her own private thinking. It is constraining because the child has to learn to make it public for the other person; to specify what is in his or her head for the benefit of others who cannot be privy to this domain of knowledge; to signal to them when previously unmentioned and therefore new knowledge is coming up; to recognize old information that speaker and listener can be assumed to share; and to recognize information that is old because it was mentioned earlier in the conversation. Knowing of the separate existence of the other person and being able to take up the other's

perspective is a necessary prerequisite for launching on the language journey. But learning the numerous intricacies and nuances which detail this distinction is a long road which entails gaining control of many linguistic devices which allow you to specify what is in your head for the benefit of others (or by lying to specify other than what you are really thinking) until eventually language becomes communicable to anyone at any time. In other words, language and language alone comes to bear the full burden of communication, without gestural, intonational and situational props, culminating in the act of pure linguistic communication as in writing.

It is likely that these linguistic feats are accomplished by the same mental mechanism used in gaining an operational concept of number. As Piaget describes, children learn to "count" by slowly learning to "discount" such irrelevancies as spatial displacement, size or any other perceptual attributes of the array. As with language we might say that by taking cognizance of their own momentary and idiosyncratic viewpoint, and by degrees slowly cancelling this out of the equation, children are transforming subjective appearance into objective concept. In learning both number and language structure, children take account of their own perspective and view it as one of any number of perspectives; thereby they are able to speak and count as if the private domain did not exist, and therefore to make the private public and communicable.

In a recent study in my own university, we tried to help children appreciate where their private thoughts began and ended, examining

the changes brought about by our intervention.* Simply put, we compared the children's ability to tell their teacher a story from a picture, under two conditions: (1) when both teacher and child were looking at the picture, and (2) when only the child was looking at the picture, due to the fact that the teacher had her "sore eyes" bandaged. Subjects were a group of four year old children from a disadvantaged background. A previous study had shown that when the picture was perceptually accessible to a child alone, the child produced more complex and compound sentences, as opposed to strings of juxtaposed words (Bokus, 1978). Our study examined the nature of these changes, analyzing some of them in detail. We noted that in the situation of non-shared perception, the child strived, and with some success, to speak more explicitly and less ambiguously. The following is an example of a disambiguating phrase which helped to identify information for the blindfolded listener:

/ and a woman that was looking in the shop, looked too /

or the following self-correction which helped to clarify the referent:

/ it s/c the cat was looking /.

(self correction)

Also it was noted that children used the adult device of anaphoric reference, that is of introducing a new topic by the indefinite article "a" followed by the definite article "the" when next encountering the same topic, four times as frequently in the blindfolded conditions than in the shared perception conditions, thus:

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*For details of this and following examples, apply to Department of Psychology, University College, Dublin, Ireland.

/ This day a mammy went up to the bedroom /

/ and the mammy was cross /

and again:

/ Once upon a time a boy tripped over a dog /

/ And he throwed his ball on the dog /

These examples from a non-shared situation show the child's sure control over the mechanisms for introducing new and old information. The use of the indefinite article in "a dog" introduces this dog as one of many others that it might have been, while the switch to the definite article in the next line has a co-referential function in which "the dog" refers to the one just introduced. Likewise, "he" and "his" in the second line also refer to "a boy" unspecified but now identified as the same as the previously mentioned one. Thus in two short utterances we can see how words come to be based on a series of shared assumptions and rules for cooperating in conversation as well as a number of devices for the "stitching together" of text.

Our results show the reserves of skill possessed by socially disadvantaged children in the difficult art of telling and maintaining a good story. It has been suggested that [illegible] the main reason that children from disadvantaged homes are poor at language is that they fail to recognize their listener's communicative needs (De Villiers, 1978). This study would appear to show that they are in no way insensitive to these needs but that they do require extra assistance in recognising them. For example, they may not respond to the usual need of the teacher of "playing with words," which is what most language lessons really are, but will respond to the teacher when she has a real need, like not being able to see. (It is interesting that on

subsequent days, the mothers of these children enquired about the teacher's eye condition, showing that the children had regarded the episode as newsworthy, probably because they felt they had played an active part in helping the teacher.) This study does not give any evidence of whether socially disadvantaged children are better or worse than their counterparts from a more privileged socio-economic background, but it does show how some of the children were influenced by a changed context which enabled them to call on their own resources and competencies when they perceived a real need for communication. We had managed to create good and bad conditions for the telling of picture stories, and we had identified the good condition. The same child with the same teacher could in fact substantially alter his or her language output when perceiving a meaning and an urgency in the situation. The children in the conditions of shared perception were performing at an inferior level because they presumed that since some information was shared, all information was shared. Here the discourse lost its communicative intent since the child was led into the trap of believing that since the adult could see the picture, she could also see inside the child's mind. To revert to an earlier distinction, the child possessed the rules of usage, syntactical as well as textual, but needed an opportunity to put them to use. We would now go further and make the claim (a claim that awaits empirical substantiation) that by giving the children an opportunity to put these rules to use, of having their competence exercised and stretched as it were, we were in fact altering that competence and making the children more assured of the rules. For as we noted earlier, learning the use to which language is put is not merely a by-product of knowing the language, but the most essential, most

difficult and most needed exercise of these preschool years. The children do not merely learn a language and then use it on every possible occasion, but rather vice versa. They see language working for themselves and for others, and through this they learn its structure and its meaning.

What are the implications of stressing the functional aspects of language and how do we create meaningful situations which afford an opportunity for the exercise of language competency? The first and most simple answer to this question is that we do not need to create such situations in the classroom: they are all around us awaiting our exploitation. Every nursery day provides opportunities for informal interaction between child and teacher, at snack or toileting time, hanging up coats, changing shoes and doing all the other business of the day's living. Just as the young child learned to speak by learning to mean and to interact with the others in the environment, so too there are many meaningful and familiar situations in which the child is an expert, or interested in becoming one, such as tying laces, fetching a snack, getting ready for "home time" and all the other rituals of school life. And just as with the infant who learns to mean before learning to speak, so it is with the four year old: it is likely that it is out of these familiar and intelligible situations that language will most easily emerge. These are the pivotal activities for language lessons and not mere accidental trimmings to the school day. They have a meaning which is clear to the child, and language under such circumstances comes easily.

Once we fully grasp the principle that language is created and strengthened against a background of living expression, our daily

nursery practice takes on a new meaning. For example, allowing children to talk about what has happened at home or outside, asking them for news that we could not have heard but for them, gives them a real feeling of communication. If a child knows something that the adult cannot know and senses a corresponding curiosity on the adult's part, the conditions are set for good conversation. It is in this light, too, that we must examine the question and answer procedures of the classroom. Most frequently the meaning of such exchanges is that of the child guessing what is going on inside the adult-questioner's mind. We know and accept that the eventual mode of teacher-pupil interaction is likely to be that of questioning leading to one particular answer (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975), but we might ponder the advisability of such a question and answer technique with children of four, five and six years coming fresh and unschooled from home. True, questions are asked at home, but children ask them of adults just as often as adults ask them of children. What is more, they are always asked on both sides to build up a conjoint meaning in which both are contributing some part. The classroom question and answer session starts off from a plan or strategy in the teacher's head, often from a curriculum plan laid out on a page that can be seen in the mind's eye. For the teacher it has both context and intention, the context of a term's work and the intention of getting from point A to point B. But the children cannot see the plan or strategy along which the adult is progressing, so the situation lacks context and intention for them. It comes out of nowhere and disappears at the end of the lesson, and the children are not quite sure why they are going through this session beyond the conversational rule of trying to follow discourse that is directed your way. Is it any

wonder that under such circumstances the children's language often deteriorates to a listless monosyllable and they fail to produce at the level of their true competence?

Metalinguistic Activities

Much of the life of school is likely to be perceived by children as being of the kind in which it will not make any difference whether one speaks or keeps quiet; a given child's intervention will make no substantial impact. It is likely that the lack of any substantial verbal interaction between teacher and children from disadvantaged homes springs from the fact that, unlike the child in the blindfolded situation, the child in the typical classroom sees no meaningful part to play. Sociolinguists have told us that the children's language is the means by which they are socialized. If the home background is such that conversation is reserved for the utilitarian purposes of eating or sleeping, of switching on or off television, with little manipulation of speech and language for its own sake, for story telling or making verbal games, then the later activity is not seen to have any use or meaning for the child. A child from such a background has no experience in using words and speech for these purposes or of seeing anyone else do so. Insofar as it is just these same activities of story telling, speech manipulation, and talking about speech which characterize the nursery school day, children from disadvantaged backgrounds will tend to perceive these activities as alien. When young children leave home to enter the world of preschool, they have two considerable adaptations to make. One is to the new group life, in which each child is sharing an adult with a large number of other children rather than having the

exclusive attention of an adult as at home. The second is the school way of talking and dealing with talk. But there are many homes where parents, for part of the day at least, do engage in a variety of speech activities, and by giving their children practice in these activities, encourage them to try a variety speech roles, such as whispering, saying prayers, telling a story, saying a poem, having a little chat, or just "speaking nicely." It would appear that the more home is like school in this way, that is in giving practice in a variety of speech roles, the easier it is for the child to adapt to school and to the school way of using talk - although the less the child needs to adapt. The more home is unlike school, the more difficult it becomes to switch to alternative speech roles for lack of practice in for example, switching from whispering to story telling--and the more the child needs to adapt.

Most of our language lessons, and indeed much of our other verbal exchanges in school, are of the type "Say this after me," "Now you tell me a story," "Give Mary a chance to speak." These are what has been described as metalinguistic activities, or talking about talk rather than communicating by means of talk (Mattingly, 1972). We have suggested that some children may hear very little of similar kinds of activity in their own homes. However, it is known that in many homes children as young as three, and even two, are beginning to talk about language. Whenever children talk about what you can say or cannot say, what is a "nice thing to say" or a "bad thing to say," they are engaged in metalinguistic activities: they are talking about language instead of by means of language. The following example shows how a three year old makes language usage the subject of discussion. Adult and child are sitting in relaxed mood, leafing through the pages of a picture book.

C. Will I read this? A. Yes please

C. (Pretending to read)

OK "There's no monkeys" A. Is there not?

C. No, say "Why is there not?" A. Why is there not?

C. Cause, cause they's only

Jane and Peter

The question "Is there not?" asks only for a "yes" or "no" answer, whereas questions in English which begin with "wh" ask for a detailed reply, which in this instance the child had already prepared and intended to deliver. Language structure rather than meaning per se was the central concern in the mind of the child. I think the above example also suggests that young children, once they are embarked on a stretch of discourse, find it easier to follow their own trail rather than engage in a dialogue which demands constant adjustments of perspective and a lack of control over subsequent utterances. (It is for just this same reason that we as adults struggling along in a foreign language, can prepare a beautiful phrase for execution, but are baffled and disconcerted when our listener, understanding our utterance and totally taken in by the spurious level of fluency, pours forth a response at the same level of complexity.) But although children may not relish a dialogue partner who switches the lines they have written in advance, they do demand more than a sleeping partner. They need an auditor who is at least active enough to show that the message has been received. The following is one of many stretches of dialogue from our tapes which show the irritation of the child when the adult's standards of attention fall below an acceptable level. The conversation has been going along happily for some five or six minutes, with both partners

engaged in passing the ping-pong ball of conversation to and from, when, as so often happens, the adult's attention wanders off, only to be brought back sharply by the child.

(Child looking at picture)

C. "What is that?" said the cow, Betty — A. Mmmmmmm

C. What said that brown cow?

(What did the brown cow say?) — A. Mmmmmmm

C. (answering his own question)

"Oh them birds," brown cow

(They are birds, said the brown cow) — A. Mmmmmmm

C. Well don't speak to me like that

Well I'm not your friend.

Oh you better not.

And in this next stretch of dialogue, one can almost hear the saitsfaction of the child as he asks for and eventually receives a "Roger over and out" assurance that his message has been received.

C. Cows, pigs, birds, cows

And they liked (Gr[illegible]am/grain)

don't they

Aren't they? — A. They are

C. Aren't they allowed to get in? — A. They are

C. Said "yes" Betty — A. Pardon

C. "Yes" — A. "Yes"

It would appear that children ideally need to have an adult available to react to their speech, and being present in the same room is a different thing from being available. But the adult, if he or she wants to prolong the conversation, should not control its direction, as this

results in a loss of predictability for the child. The child in the two examples above is striving hard to keep control of the tempo of the conversation, because in this way he can match the mental effort or pace the information processing to his own speed, and thus can keep up the verbal exchange with skill and ease.

It might be considered that the kind of verbal interaction described above is descriptive of middle class children or prescriptive of a one-to-one relationship with an adult, and therefore of little relevance in the preschoool situation. True, a teacher is not the middle class mother, celebrated in psychology textbooks as she brings her child from room to room while doing the housework, setting up little islands of "intersubjectivity" for interactive dialogue. But the preschool classroom is a place where play is seen as of great importance and significance in the child's development, and the kind of verbal activities we have been discussing share many of the aspects of play, in fact are considered by many to constitute verbal play. Just as in play we see an uncoupling from reality, where a doll or a towel rolled up can be a baby, so in verbal play we see an uncoupling from real meaning, an "as if" quality into which the child enters. I would venture to suggest, from my experience of listening to children on tape in a variety of settings, that opportunities like the above, for talking about talk, are most likely to take place where there is not a great deal of mental exercise going on, or where the information processing demanded is negligible. This would describe the child's activities in ritualized make-believe conditions. The occasions when the child is most likely to play with language appear to be during those apparently aimless and desultory exchanges between adult and child, which appear to provide

security and psychological space for the child to wander linguistically. We do know that children from disadvantaged social backgrounds very often have great difficulty in playing in make-believe activity. But shouldn't this deficit now be the focus of our attentions? All children from all backgrounds have, at least in rudimentary form, a life of the imagination. As well as relying on the meaning of real life, the teacher can call on that second order of meaning known as make-believe and imagination, a life that may be limited by the child's background, but which nevertheless is available to every normal child after the age of twelve months.[4] Does the foregoing argument, stressing the functional aspects of play as well as the ability of the teacher to use the child's make-believe capacity for verbal play, imply that the teacher cannot prepare in advance a program of action, but must always react to the child's behavior in a catch-as-catch-can fashion? We are now back in the familiar territory of structured versus child-centered programs. A reading of the literature and a knowledge of personnel in the field would lead us to conclude that most early educators would decline to come down on one side or the other, feeling a need for the security of a structure which allowed preparations in advance, while at the same time desiring a modicum of non-structuring to ensure them the freedom of reacting to the needs of the children and the opportunities of the moment.

We could predict that any program which did not contain both of these elemets would stand little chance of surviving beyond the initial enthusiasm accompanying any novel venture. The recently published program of the United Kingdom National Foundation for Educational Research appears to contain both elements in judicious proportions

(Curtis and Hill, 1978). A collaborative effort of one hundred and fifty teachers plus a research team, it calls itself "My World: A Handbook of Ideas," an obvious attempt to avoid either the suggestion of a structured prescribed program or the ad hoc effect of a series of "cook book" suggestions. The five interrelated activities of Talking Points, Linked Activities, Individual Activities, Suggested Rhymes and Songs, and Users Own Ideas, center around nine themes such as Myself, My Family, Food and Clothes, and each theme is further sub-divided into sub-themes, each of which is treated under the headings of the five interrelated activities. Each item of activity has an identifying symbol indicating the focus of development in which it is involved; thus, Self Awareness ( ); Language and Listening Skills ( ); Intellectual Development ( ); Social Skills ( ), and Perceptual Skills ( ). This preschool program purports to be a complete curriculum rather than simply a language program, but the functional approach to language which we have been discussing could not be attempted without inclusion of at least the range of developmental skills outlined above. In summary, this program would appear to be acceptable to the demands of the preschool practitioner and to offer scope for a functional approach to language development - qualities I suggest we should demand of any language program for our preschools.

Putting language to good use

What then might we conclude from recent psycholinguistic insights which has relevance to the preschool program? The first and most important message is that the child be allowed to use language in the creation of meaning, in working out with the adult a problem that is

felt as real by both. We noted that when children had to make the system work for them in the blindfolded situation, the structure content of the system improved on several scores. Language became more precise and detailed, referential communication became more accurate and the child exercised more contextual skills. In a practical extension of this work we must examine the customary practice of arranging our classroom before a language lesson begins, so that it is laid out for pupil and adult to see. Is it possible that our practice is actually impoverishing the communicative opportunities by misleading the child into thinking that the existence of some shared information means all information is shared?

I am not quite sure of the implications of this for classroom teaching, but it might imply some questioning of our assumption that a child with nothing to say will be helped by our asking for a description of a picture, an object or event which both we and the child can see. Instead we should seek, by all possible means, for communicative intent, where the child wants to, means to tell us something. It would also suggest that in listening to and collecting children's speech for purposes of evaluation, diagnosis and remediation we will get different levels of complexity depending on the conditions prevailing at that time regarding the child's communicative intent.

There is one obvious conclusion to be drawn from this insistence on child and adult engaging in mutual meaningful activities; in fact it is so obvious that I hesitate to make it. It is that any administrative set up or preschool structure which keeps the teacher from "rubbing against" the child in the course of the day is contra-indicated. If the teacher is regarded as a learning specialist or program specialist in

the narrow sense, with ancillaries to do the caring task, or if the classroom numbers are so large that the teachers can not rub shoulders with the child in the course of the day, the situation is not a promising one for the development of early language skills and their use. Any attempts to move away from the traditional model of preschool as part care and part school, as a half-way house between home and school, should be resisted on the grounds that this traditional system appears to be nearer the psycholinguistic desideratum, offering as it does a semi-structured setting in which children may create their own meaning.

I have also suggested that schoolroom question and answer sessions are often totally outside the experience of the young child. When the questioner obviously knows the answer, he or she does not need any help, and supplying the answer is not going to alter the situation in any way. What children have to learn, and this takes time, is that ours is a conventionalized way of asking questions where the normal rules are suspended, a kind of game played by teacher and pupil. The trouble with question and answer games, however, is the trouble with most verbal games - they penalize the children we are most anxious to help. Children from homes with a linguistic or cultural background different from that of the school will, by definition, have difficulties in adjustment to school practice.

But children from a cultural background in which language is not a subject for discussion, to be played with and dissected, will have the added handicap of being inexpert at adjusting or switching codes. We have seen from the evidence of our tapes how children revel in the game of talking about talk, and we have tried to identify the kind of play situation where this activity might emerge. It is sometimes

said that children from socially disadvantaged backgrounds are primarily in need of a structured program, having little structure or ritual in their own homes. If we add to this the fact that out of school they appear to have a great deal of time for free and unsupervised play, we might be tempted to conclude that they do not need any opportunity for classroom play. But is it possible that street games or games involving physical activity are not such rich sources for the life of the imagination as puppets, drama and make-believe verbal games? One thing we do not know, and we need to know, is how to best foster the life of the imagination in all our children, a human accomplishment no less than that of language. In looking over the transcripts of our children's narratives, it occurred to me that it was just this aspect of language that we had failed to capture. The stretches which occasioned us the most amusement and respect, and caused us to lose sight of our count of indefinite articles, were those that sober psycholinguistic science had failed to grasp. This is not to conclude on an obscurantist note, but rather to recognize and rejoice more abundantly in the phenomenon of our children's language. For in what sense could a count of disambiguating phrases or a description of socio-economic deprivation capture the drama of four year old Edward's story:

"A little girl's mammy put the little girl in the bed
And the teddy bear was looking
and she was talking to the doctor and the doctor said
'You'll have to stay in bed
You'll have to keep that little girl in bed for two months
Don't let her go to school and don't let her out to play
Just, just put new pyjamas on her'

and he went

and that's the end of the story."

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